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Abstract
We develop a Kaleckian model of growth with an endogenous em-
ployment rate and investigate the features following Cassetti(2003)
which has considered bargaining power of workers and firms and tech-
nical progress. We assume that both of the target wage share and
the technical progress depend on the rate of change of employment
rate, and they become zero in steady state. We also assume that cap-
ital accumulation is a decreasing function in employment to consider
maturity which defines the present capitalism society.
From the above refinements, we get results different from Cas-
setti(2003). An increase in the saving rate does not make the growth
rate decrease, but the utilization decrease. In addition to that, an
increase in the rate of labor productivity exerts a positive impact on
growth.
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Introduction
At the beginning, heterodox schools have developed the conflict theory of
inflation and the interaction between economic growth and income distribu-
tion separately 1. But, gradually the researches which integrated them like
Marglin(1984), Dutt(1992), Cassetti(2002, 2003), and Sasaki(2011a, 2011b,
2010), have emarged 2.
This paper is inspired by Cassetti(2003). Cassetti(2003) develops the
model with technical progress and discusses if the standard Kaleckian re-
sults, the paradox of thrift and the direct relationship between wages and
accumulation, are confirmed and the effect of technical progress.
The one special feature is that the target wage share increases directly
with the rate of change of employment. This comes from the idea that
workers’ fear of unemployment depends on the rate of change of employment
because it affects the workers’ bargaining strength. We adopt the rate of
change of employment rate instead of it because it is better to reveal the fear
of unemployment 3. Even if the rate of change of employment is constant,
workers’ fear is supposed to increase when the rate of change of population
or new entry to labor market increases and the rate of change of employment
rate decreases.
The second feature is that technical progress depends on the rate of pro-
ductivity. But, here too, we adopt the rate of change of employment rate
instead of it because we pay attention to the aspect technical progress re-
sponds to shortages of labor like Dutt(2006) rather than Kaldor-Verdoon
Law.
We also assume that capital accumulation is a decreasing function in em-
ployment to consider maturity which defines the present capitalism society,
following Skott and Zipperer(2010a, 2010b). By doing so we can avoid a
criticism to Kaleckian that there is no constant employment rate in steady
state.
We are interested in the longer term as employment rate can be ad-
1We can take up Okishio(1959) as the former and Rowthorn(1981) and Dutt(1984) as
the latter.
2Marglin(1984) intends to integrate Neo-Marxian and Neo-Keynesian. Dutt(1992) in-
vestigates the relation between bargaining power, income distribution, and accumulation,
and how the economy can experience cyclical growth. Cassetti(2002) builds the model
that the workers’ requirement profit rate depends on the rate of employment, while in
Sasaki(2011a, 2011b, 2010) the rate of the technical progress depends on the employment
rate.
3Lavoie(1992) adopts the same assumption. But it is different from us in that we
consider that the rate of change of employment rate converges to zero in the long-run.
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justed to a value4. Thus, it can be thought that our model extends the
Cassetti(2003) model in the long run. We investigate how such extensions
change the results in Cassetti(2003).
We begin in Section 1 with the structure of the model. The equilibrium
values and the comparative statics are then shown in Section 2. Finally, in
the conclusion we discuss our results.
1 The structure of the model
We fundamentally follow Cassetti(2003). We assume two social classes, capi-
talists and workers, goods for both consumption and investment, and demand
constraint economy.
Capitalists save a constant fraction of their profit, while workers spend
all their income. Thus, we get the Cambridge equation:
g = sr (1)
where g, s, and r are the rate of growth, the saving propensity of profit
earners, and the profit rate.
We can write the profit rate as
r =
1
k
mu (2)
where k, m, and u are the capital stock to the real full capacity output which
is constant, the share of profits in national income, and the actual utilization
rate.
The rate of accumulation desired by firms gd is as follows.
gd = γ + ²u+ σλ− µe γ > 0, ² > 0, σ > 0, µ > 0 (3)
where γ, λ, and e are the autonomous rate of growth of capital, the rate
of productivity growth, and the employment rate. In a maturity economy
employment rate can be a constraint because the increase strengthens workers
vis-a-vis management, and then animal spirits may fall off, as Skott and
Zipperer(2010b) pointed out 5. It is meant in the fourth term of right hand
in (3) 6.
4In the long run we need to consider an equilibrium value of capacity utilization. But
the issue is beyond range of this paper. Refer to Skott(2011) for the concise explanation.
5The origin of this specification is the argument on “inflation barrier” by Robin-
son(1962). Flaschel and Skott(2005) also adopt same one.
6The maturity may be regarded as an inconsistency with the workers’ target income
share of (8) in that it adopts the employment rate level. Although we can add the level
effect to (8), we adopt the above specification for a tractability. We also have to mention
that such a level effect is needed for an existence of an employment rate in steady state.
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We write the endogenous technical progress function in linear form
λ = λ0 + λ1(g − λ− n)− λ2m λ0 > 0, λ1 > 0, λ2 > 0 (4)
where n is the growth rate of labor. g − λ − n is the rate of change of
employment rate with a capacity utilization 7. The second term of right hand
in (4) means that a faster rate of growth in change of employment results in
a faster rate of labour-augmenting technological change. The specification
follows Dutt(2006). The third term of right hand in (4) means that an
increase in the real wage which amounts to a decrease in the profit share
accelerates the productivity pace.
When firms set the price as a mark-up on labor costs, we get
p =
w
a
(
1
1−m) (5)
where p, w, and a are price, nominal wage, and labor productivity.
Differentiating (5) with respect to time, we obtain
p˙
p
=
w˙
w
+
m˙
1−m − λ (6)
Workers set the nominal wage in purpose of limiting the firm’s profits
share. When the expectation is adaptive, the rate of wage inflation is
w˙
w
= θw(m−mw) θw > 0 (7)
where mw is workers’ target income share which depends on the fear of un-
employment. Because we can think that the rate of growth of employment
rate shows the fear, we get
mw = v0 − v1(g − λ− n) v0 > 0, v1 > 0 (8)
Firms adopt adaptive expectations and adjust the price to get closer to
the target share. The rate of price inflation is
p˙
p
= θf (mf −m) (9)
where mf is firms’ target income share which is assumed to be constant m0
8.
7We are interested in long run. Thus, here we assume that a product market equilibrates
so that there is a capacity utilization.
8We may need to consider the expected rate of inflation in (7) and (9). It can be also
thought that the endogenity in mf changes our results. These are the suggestions by Peter
Skott. We adopt Cassetti(2003)’s assumptions as possible as we can because we weight its
extension to the long run.
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The dynamic equation for the employment rate with a capacity utilization
is
eˆ = gd − λ− n (10)
Next, we intensify the above model.
From (4), we get
λ =
λ0 + λ1(g − n)− λ2m
1 + λ1
(11)
From (3), (11), and g = gd,
g =
1 + λ1
1 + λ1 − σλ1 (γ + ²u+ σ
λ0 − λ1n− λ2m
1 + λ2
− µe) (12)
The specification is still problematic as Skott(2012) pointed out. However,
it is in beyond the purpose of this paper.
Next, from (1), (2), and (12), we get
u =
1+λ1
1+λ1−σλ1 (γ + σ
λ0−λ1n−λ2m
1+λ1
− µe)
sm
k
− (1+λ1)²
1+λ1−σλ1
(13)
When we substitute (13) for (12), we get
g =
1 + λ1
1 + λ1 − σλ1{γ+²
1+λ1
1+λ1−σλ1 (γ + σ
λ0−λ1n−λ2m
1+λ1
− µe)
sm
k
− (1+λ1)²
1+λ1−σλ1
+σ
λ0 − λ1n− λ2m
1 + λ1
−µe}
(14)
Then, from (11) and (14), we get
λ =
λ0 − λ1n− λ2m
1 + λ1
+
λ1
1 + λ1 − σλ1{γ + ²
1+λ1
1+λ1−σλ1 (γ + σ
λ0−λ1n−λ2m
1+λ1
− µe)
sm
k
− (1+λ1)²
1+λ1−σλ1
+σ
λ0 − λ1n− λ2m
1 + λ1
− µe}(15)
Substituting (14) and (15) for (8), we find the relation between mw, m,
and e
mw = v0 − v1[ 1
1 + λ1 − σλ1{γ + ²
1+λ1
1+λ1−σλ1 (γ + σ
λ0−λ1n−λ2m
1+λ1
− µe)
sm
k
− (1 + λ1)²
1 + λ1 − σλ1 + σ
λ0 − λ1n− λ2m
1 + λ1
− µe} − λ0 − λ1n− λ2m
1 + λ1
− n] (16)
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From (6), (15), and (16), the dynamic equation of profit share m becomes
m˙
1−m = θf (m0 −m)− θw(m− v0 − v1
λ0 − λ1n− λ2m
1 + λ1
− v1n) + λ0 − λ1n− λ2m
1 + λ1
+
λ1 − θwv1
1 + λ1 − σλ1{γ + ²
1+λ1
1+λ1−σλ1 (γ + σ
λ0−λ1n−λ2m
1+λ1
− µe)
sm
k
− (1+λ1)²
1+λ1−σλ1
+ σ
λ0 − λ1n− λ2m
1 + λ1
− µe}(17)
substituting (14) and (15) for (10), the dynamic equation of employment
rate e is
e˙ = [
1
1 + λ1 − σλ1{γ + ²
1+λ1
1+λ1−σλ1 (γ + σ
λ0−λ1n−λ2m
1+λ1
− µe)
sm
k
− (1+λ1)²
1+λ1−σλ1
+ σ
λ0 − λ1n− λ2m
1 + λ1
− µe}
−λ0 − λ1n− λ2m
1 + λ1
− n]e(18)
We now have seven main endogenous variables, u, g, λ, mw, r, m, and
e and seven equations, (2) and (13)∼(18). The relation for determination is
as follows. In (17) and (18), we assume arbitrary values of m and e. Thus,
u in (13), g in (14), λ in (15), and mw in (16) are determined. Then r is
determined in (2). After the determination, m and e move in (17) and (18).
Thus, the system is completed.
2 Equilibrium values and comparative statics
In this section, we induce equilibrium values and do comparative statics.
When m˙ = e˙ = 0 in (17) and (18), we get
m∗ =
θfm0 + θwv0 + λ0
θf + θw + λ2
(19)
From (4) and (19),
λ∗ = λ0 − λ2 θfm0 + θwv0 + λ0
θf + θw + λ2
(20)
Using (20) and e˙ = 0,
g∗ =
λ0(θf + θw)− λ2(θfm0 + θwv0)
θf + θw + λ2
+ n (21)
substituting (21) for (1), we get
r∗ =
1
s
(λ0 + n− λ2 θf + θw + λ2
θfm0 + θwv0 + λ0
) (22)
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m∗ e∗ u∗ g∗ λ∗ r∗
v0 + + − − − +
v1 0 0 0 0 0 0
θw − − + + + −
θf + + − − − +
m0 + + − − − +
s 0 − − 0 0 −
γ 0 + 0 0 0 0
² 0 + 0 0 0 0
σ 0 + 0 0 0 0
λ0 + ± ± + + +
λ1 0 0 0 0 0 0
λ2 − ± ± − − −
Table 1: Comparative Statics
Using (2), (19), and (22), we get
u∗ =
k
s
{(λ0 + n)(θf + θw + λ2)
θfm0 + θwv0 + λ0
− λ2} (23)
Substituting (20) and (23) for (3), we have
e∗ =
( ²k
sm∗ − 1)(λ0 − λ2m∗ + n) + σ(λ0 − λ2m∗) + γ
µ
(24)
The relation among equilibrium values is as follows. First of all, labor-
management negotiation and technical progress determine the profit sharem.
The technical progress also determines the growth rate g. Then the growth
rate determines the profit rate r and capacity utilization u. Finally, g and u
determine employment e.
The results of comparative statics are as Table 19.
We mention results to which we have to pay attention.
P.1 An increase in the workers’ pay demand which is a fall in v0
or a rise in θw causes an increase in the utilization, growth rate, and
technical progress rate and a decrease in the profit share, employment
rate, and profit rate.
9Refer to Appendix 1 for the stability condition and Appendix 2 for the explanation
about calculations.
7
P.2 An increase in the firms’ price demand which is a rise in θf
or m0 causes an increase in the profit share, employment rate, and
profit rate and a decrease in the utilization, growth rate, and technical
progress rate.
The above results are symmetric. An increase in the profit share means
distribution from workers to firms, so it makes the profit rate increase. But
the whole demand decreases. Thus, utilization and growth rate decrease.
Technical progress rate decreases because of an increase in the profit share.
The employment rate decreases corresponding to an increase in the growth
rate.
P.3 An increase in the saving rate causes a decrease in the employment
rate, utilization rate, and profit rate. It doesn’t affect the profit share. Thus,
the growth rate and technical progress don’t change.
It is the reason that the variation of saving rate doesn’t affect labor
management negotiation and technical progress in our model.
P.4 Increases in the parameters of investment which are γ, ², and σ
cause just a decrease in the employment rate.
The variation of demand in investment is adjusted by only employment
rate because real investment is determined by factors of technical progress
and profit share.
P.5 Increases in the parameters of technical progress which are a
rise in λ0 and a fall in λ2 cause an increase in the profit share, growth
rate, technical progress, and profit rate.
This result also reflects on the feature in our model which factors of
technical progress determine the growth rate.
3 Conclusion
We have developed a Kaleckian model of growth with an endogenous em-
ployment rate and investigated the features. Although the platform of our
model is Cassetti(2003), it has some different characteristics. We are inter-
ested in longer term which there is a value of employment rate in steady
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state. Thus, we assumed that both of the target wage share and the tech-
nical progress depend on the rate of change of employment rate, and they
become zero in steady state. We also assumed that capital accumulation is
a decreasing function in employment to consider maturity which defines the
present capitalism society.
From the above refinements, we got results different from Cassetti(2003).
An increase in the saving rate does not make the growth rate decrease, but
the utilization decrease. This resulted from our formalization that the growth
rate is determined by factors of technical progress and class conflicts in steady
state. In Cassetti(2003), the growth rate decreases in the case as a canonical
Kaleckian model because of no labor constraint in it. In addition to that,
we got the result that an increase in the rate of labor productivity exerts a
positive impact on growth. In Cassetti(2003), the effect is ambiguous because
it also has the contrary effect, the slowdown in workers’ aspirations caused
by the fall in the employment rate of growth. Our model has does not have
that effect in steady state. The direct impact of productivity parameters on
the productivity growth also dominates the indirect one through an increase
in profit rate.
Then, what is the relation between our model and Cassetti(2003)? We
think that Cassetti(2003) is short run and the adjustment on employment is
not finished, while our model is long run and the adjustment on employment
is finished.
We left out the endogenous depreciation rate which reveals “obsolescence
effect” in Cassetti(2003) for simplicity. The issue should be taken on later.
Appendix 1
Elements of Jacobian in (17) and (18) are as follows.
a11 = −θf − θw − λ2
1 + λ1
− θwv1 λ2
1 + λ1
+
λ1 − θwv1
1 + λ1 − σλ1
×[²
1+λ1
1+λ1−σλ1{−σ λ21+λ2 ( smk −
(1+λ1)²
1+λ1−σλ1 )− (γ + σ λ0−λ1n−λ2m1+λ1 − µe) sk}
{ sm
k
− (1+λ1)²
1+λ1−σλ1}2
− σ λ2
1 + λ1
](25)
a12 =
λ1 − θwv1
1 + λ1 − σλ1{−²
1+λ1
1+λ1−σλ1µ
sm
k
− (1+λ1)²
1+λ1−σλ1
− µ} < 0 (26)
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a21 = [
1
1 + λ1 − σλ1{²
1+λ1
1+λ1−σλ1{−σ λ21+λ2 ( smk −
(1+λ1)²
1+λ1−σλ1 )− (γ + σ λ0−λ1n−λ2m1+λ1 − µe) sk}
{ sm
k
− (1+λ1)²
1+λ1−σλ1}2
−σ λ2
1 + λ1
}+ λ2
1 + λ1
]e(27)
a22 =
1
1 + λ1 − σλ1{−²
1+λ1
1+λ1−σλ1µ
sm
k
− (1+λ1)²
1+λ1−σλ1
− µ}e < 0 (28)
From (25)∼(28), we get
det =
(θf + θw + λ2)eµ
1 + λ1 − σλ1 {²
1+λ1
1+λ1−σλ1
sm
k
− (1+λ1)²
1+λ1−σλ1
+ 1} > 0 (29)
Thus, when we assume a11 < 0, the formula is carried by trace < 0 and
the system is stable in neighborhood of the equilibrium.
Appendix 2
The results in Table 1 come from the equilibrium values in (19)∼(24), but
the following equations which show relation between m∗ and the rest of en-
dogenous equilibrium variables may be useful for the interpretation.
From (4) and eˆ = 0,
λ∗ = λ0 − λ2m∗ (30)
g∗ = λ0 − λ2m∗ + n (31)
From (1) and (31),
r∗ =
1
s
(λ0 − λ2m∗ + n) (32)
From (1), (2), and (31),
u∗ =
k
s
(
λ0 + n
m∗
− λ2) (33)
We show some results of calculations which are supposed to be useful.
From (23),
du∗
dλ0
=
k
s
(θf + θw + λ2)
θfm0 + θwv0 − n
(θfm0 + θwv0 + λ0)2
(34)
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From (21),
dg∗
dλ2
= −θfm0 + θwv0 + λ0
θf + θw + λ2
+ λ2
θfm0 + θwv0 + λ0
(θf + θw + λ2)2
=
−(θfm0 + θwv0 + λ0)(θf + θw + λ2) + λ2(θfm0 + θwv0 + λ0)
(θf + θw + λ2)2
=
−(θfm0 + θwv0 + λ0)(θf + θw)
(θf + θw + λ2)2
< 0 (35)
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